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The Strained Dynamic of the Least Restrictive Environment Concept in 
the IDEA 
 
By Bonnie Spiro Schinagle and Marilyn J. Bartlett* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Preliminary Remarks 
 “Disability” is not a simple term referring to a narrow state of existence.1 Disability 
encompasses those with physical challenges as well as the entirety of human intellectual 
capability—from extreme impairment to extreme gift. Rigid adherence to placing children in the 
general education population is a dangerously simplified view; placement in the general public 
school environment can benefit some students but irretrievably damage others.2 Thus, the 
individualization mandate of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”)3 is 
theoretically sound, but elevating the mainstreaming concept to the level of a mandate is not.  
What we propose here is acceptance of inclusion as a parent-driven mandate rather than a 
mechanically-applied rule. Parents, after all, know their children best. In the Authors’ experience, 
placement negotiations between parents and school districts are more a matter of jockeying for 
position in which school districts put their financial interests at the forefront.4 School districts 
have greater resources than do parents, resulting in an extreme imbalance in bargaining power.5 
The Authors agree with Colker that inclusion should be a means to “improve the educational 
outcome for children with disabilities”6 and that those parents wishing to have their children 
participate in mainstream educational settings be supported.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Bonnie Spiro Schinagle is a special education lawyer in New York. She earned her Juris Doctor and Master of Laws degrees from 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. She received additional training at The Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of 
William & Mary, Institute for Special Education Advocacy. 
Marilyn J. Bartlett is a professor of educational administration and law at Texas A&M University Kingsville. She earned 
her Bachelor of Science in Education at Worcester State University (Ma.), a Master’s Degree in Special Education at Boston 
University, a Doctor of Philosophy in Organizational Studies at New York University and a Juris Doctor at Vermont Law School. She 
is a trained advocate having studied at The Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William & Mary, Institute for Special 
Education Advocacy. 
1 This complexity was recognized by Congress in 1975. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 8 (1975); see also Ruth Colker, The Disability 
Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 799–800 (2006). 
2 H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 9 (“An optimal situation, of course, would be one in which the child is placed in a regular classroom. The 
Committee [on Education and Labor] recognizes that this is not always the most beneficial place of instruction.”); see also Colker, 
supra note 1, at 796–97 (stating that for some children the integration presumption “hinders the development of an appropriate 
individualized education program” and with certain disabilities, such as dyslexia, infinite modifications are unlikely to enable a 
student to learn effectively in a general education classroom).  
3 Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491 (2012). 
4 See infra note 9. 
5 Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the IDEA: Collaborative in Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 450–54 (2012) (noting that special education hearings can cost thousands in legal fees, that school districts 
have law firms on retainer and that liability insurance is available to cover special education claim defense costs); see also The 
Sandner Grp., School Board Legal Liability (SBLL), OKLA. SCH. RISK MGMT. TRUST, http://www.osrmt.org/SBLL.html (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2015) (noting the availability of a school board legal liability insurance coverage with a $500,000 defense coverage limit for 
defense of “administrative hearings seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in special education hearings”); ACE GRP., ACE 
SCHOLASTIC ADVANTAGE EDUCATORS LEGAL LIABILITY POLICY (2015), available at http://www.acegroup.com/us-en/assets/617200-
ace-scholastic-advantage-03.15.pdf (noting the availability of coverage for claims arising out of Individual Education Plan/Special 
Needs Due Process Hearings or Desegregation). Chopp also notes that parents are further hampered by the fact that attorneys’ fees are 
reimbursable to the prevailing party, but that expert witness fees are not. Chopp, supra at 451 n.120 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) 
(2006); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 323 (2006).  
6 Colker, supra note 1, at 808. 
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B. Article Overview 
 The IDEA guarantees accessibility to education in public school systems for students 
with a broad range of disabilities.7 The IDEA’s mandate requiring educating disabled children in 
the “least restrictive environment” (“LRE”) focuses on accomplishing that goal.8 Orthodox 
adherence to mainstreaming may once have served an important purpose, but it does not 
necessarily serve each child. In point of fact, the LRE requirement may well be at odds with the 
IDEA’s current objectives of providing an education that promotes preparation for “further 
education, employment, and independent living.”9  
 One of the initial motivations for the IDEA was to open the doors of public schools to 
students who were either excluded entirely or for whom resources were not available.10 Yet many 
parents find that their children’s needs are not served by the public schools, even with the 
availability of a variety of public educational settings. Frequently, parents run in the opposite 
direction, seeking education for their children in specialized programs.11 In those circumstances, 
school districts frequently assert restrictiveness as a defense to claims for private school tuition, 
and the implication is that those districts are motivated more by financial interests rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Qualifying disabilities are “[intellectual disabilities], hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, 
visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as ‘emotional disturbance’), 
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities” for which the child, 
“by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii). Children aged three to nine are 
considered disabled if they “experience[e] developmental delays as defined by the State . . . in [one] or more of the following areas: 
physical development; cognitive development; communication development; social or emotional development; or adaptive 
development . . .  .” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i). “Specific learning disability” is defined as “a disorder in [one] or more of the basic 
psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in the 
imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30). “[P]erceptual 
disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia” are included in this category, while 
learning problems that are “primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities, of [intellectual disability], of emotional 
disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage” are not. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(B), (C). 
8 The objective of inclusion was “to improve student learning, including socialization . . . and educational attainment.” Christian P. 
Wilkens, Students with Disabilities in Urban Massachusetts Charter Schools: Access to Regular Classrooms, 31 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 
1, 3 (2011), available at http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1374/1541. But even after passage of the IDEA, “special education remained 
primarily the domain of specialists; it was typically administered in separate schools, separate wings or separate classrooms, and 
taught by separate teachers. Students with disabilities—even those entirely capable of benefit—only gradually gained equal access to 
the regular curriculum or regular teachers.” Id. at 4; see also Henry A. Beyer, A Free Appropriate Public Education, 5 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 363, 364 (1983) (stating that in 1954 “the great majority of public school districts were segregating [children with mental or 
physical handicaps] from their nonhandicapped peers, were providing them with grossly inappropriate educations from which they 
could draw little benefit, or were excluding them entirely from public education systems”).  
9 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (stating that the purpose of the IDEA is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them 
a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and 
prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living”); see generally Colker, supra note 1, at 799 (positing that 
the integration presumption was adopted from the civil rights movement “without any empirical justification” and concluding that the 
presumption actually impedes the objective of allocating educational resources that are appropriate to students’ individualized needs). 
The article caused quite a kerfuffle, resulting in responses by Mark C. Weber and Samuel Bagenstos. See RUTH COLKER, WHEN 
SEPARATE IS UNEQUAL 24 (2009) (arguing that a pure integrationist agenda was justified in a time when “individuals with disabilities 
were excluded from juries, had few educational opportunities, were disenfranchised, were often housed in inhumane warehouses . . . 
and had no ‘right to live in the world’” and urging an individual approach for each student classified as disabled); see generally Mark 
C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 174 (2007) (responding to Ruth 
Colker’s The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, supra note 1, and disagreeing that the integration presumption 
should be altogether abandoned and suggesting that integration be given greater weight if sought by the parent and less weight if 
sought by the school district); see Chopp, supra note 5, at 441. C.f. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Abolish the Integration Presumption? Not 
Yet, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (2007) (arguing that the integration presumption “requires nothing more than the most integrated 
setting appropriate to the individual child” and cautioning that abandonment of the integration presumption could revitalize reliance 
on segregated placements).  
10 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)–(D) (stating that before enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, now the 
IDEA, “the educational needs of millions of children with disabilities were not being fully met” because they “did not receive 
appropriate educational services,” they were excluded entirely from the public school system, their disabilities were undiagnosed or 
the public schools lacked “adequate resources”).  
11 See infra Part II.B and note 190. 
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morality or altruism.12 Some courts consider the restrictiveness of the unilateral private placement 
in determining whether to award tuition reimbursement, while other courts do not.13  
The “mainstreaming”14 requirement of the IDEA secures an important right. However, 
there are different concerns and interests depending on whether authorities are excluding a child 
from public education or where a parent, dissatisfied with the public education offered to their 
disabled child, has exercised his or her right to opt out of the public system. Those cases 
articulating tests to determine whether a school district has properly offered a continuum of 
placements and attempted inclusion are important, and the LRE should be a heavily-weighed 
factor in cases where parents assert a claim to have their child educated in a public school.15 
When, however, a parent seeks reimbursement for private school tuition, public school authorities 
should not be permitted to challenge the private placement on the sole ground of restrictiveness.16 
In such cases, blind insistence upon placement in the LRE tends to misdirect focus and serve to 
distract from an analysis of a child’s unique educational needs.17 Additionally, in private school 
tuition reimbursement cases, once it has been determined that the public school district has failed 
to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”), the restrictiveness of the alternative 
environment selected by the parents should be given nominal weight in rare cases, but generally 
should not be a consideration. 
This Article explores the history of the IDEA as it pertains to the LRE requirement, case 
law articulating the tests adopted to determine whether a school district has complied with the 
LRE requirement, and the different standards used to determine whether a parent’s unilateral 
private school placement is appropriate. Particular attention will be paid to the way in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See, e.g., Andrew S. Gordon, Special Education In Massachusetts: Reevaluating Standards In Light Of Fiscal Constraints, 26 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 263, 284–87 (1991) (noting tensions in Massachusetts resulting from burden of special education costs resulting from a 
high qualitative standard in that state); see also Gary L. Monserud, The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of Children 
with Disabilities, 18 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 675, 682 (2004) (discussing how Massachusetts’s repeal of heightened qualitative SPED 
mandate was driven by a desire to reduce costs). 
13 Restrictiveness considered: Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ. of E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 95, 105 (2d 
Cir. 1998); C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 836–37 (2d Cir. 2014); C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
636 F.3d 981, 991 (8th Cir. 2011). Restrictiveness not considered: Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 
391, 400 (6th Cir. 1998); Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 770 (6th Cir. 2001). Residential placements 
are viewed somewhat differently: Shaw v. Weast, 364 Fed. App’x 47, 54 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that a residential program selected 
by parents was overly restrictive where private day program offered by public district enabled child to attain educational benefit where 
her mental health issues were segregable from her educational needs); Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 588 F.3d 1004, 
1009 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a residential placement must be necessary to provide special education and related services and 
mainstreaming is a consideration in determining appropriateness). 
14 Though used interchangeably, the terms “mainstreaming” and “inclusion” are different from the concept of an education delivered 
in the LRE. “Regular classrooms” are deemed the mainstream. “Inclusion” implies the opposite of segregation, hence, 
“mainstreaming” and “inclusion” can rightly be viewed as synonymous but they are narrower than LRE, which can have many 
meanings, depending upon the placements that are possible for a disabled child. Monserud, supra note 12, at 696; see also Mark T. 
Keaney, Examining Teacher Attitudes Toward Integration: Important Considerations For Legislatures, Courts, and Schools, 56 ST. 
LOUIS L.J. 827, 828–29 (2012) (criticizing debate among legal scholars about the efficacy of the integration presumption for failure to 
account for teacher ability and attitudes toward inclusion of special education students in the general education classroom, arguing that 
legislative and judicial preference for inclusion is justified, and suggesting that factors impacting teacher attitude toward inclusion be 
addressed by legislatures, courts and schools). 
15 See Monserud, supra note 12, at 765 (noting that in cases where parents have sought modifications in neighborhood schools, “[t]he 
LRE requirement has not proved to be empowering . . . .”). 
16 On another note, the IDEA takes a short-term view and fails to consider that many children need education in a highly-specialized 
setting for later success in mainstream education and in mainstream society. 
17 Monserud, supra note 12, at 725 (discussing Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990) (weighing public 
school education in a mix of self-contained classes against private residential placement selected by parents, the court concluded that 
parent’s selection was overly restrictive and that public school placement properly permitted socialization)). Yet another scholar offers 
a compelling argument that the law’s insistence on protecting the right to education in the LRE is a protection against racial 
segregation. La Toya Baldwin Clark, The Problem with Participation, 9 AM. U. MODERN AM. 23 (2013). 
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different circuits have treated the issue of whether the LRE could be used as a defense to defeat 
parental claims for private school tuition reimbursement. The Authors agree with Weber18 that the 
application of the LRE standard should apply when parents are seeking inclusion, but should not 
be considered in evaluating unilateral private school placements in tuition reimbursement cases. 
 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IDEA 
 
At the dawn of American public education in the 1800s, people “with disabilities were 
often abused, condemned as incapable of being able to participate in social activities, and simply 
forgotten.”19 Interest in educating those with differences emerged toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, when Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet and Samuel Gridley opened schools for the 
education of the deaf, blind, and mute populations, as well as “the idiotic and feeble-minded.”20 
The effort did not extend to those with physical handicaps or who were incontinent.21 In 1850, the 
first school for youth with cognitive disabilities opened in Massachusetts.22 Though compulsory 
education also emerged in the nineteenth century, special classes served as “a mechanism to 
remove undesirables from the regular classroom.”23 Simply being physically repulsive was a 
legally sufficient basis to bar a paralyzed child from the classroom.24  
The legal principle that “separate is not equal” set forth in Brown v. Board of Education25 
has been credited with inspiring pursuit of inclusion by disability advocates.26 In the mid-1960s, 
Congress began funding states’ efforts toward improving education for the disabled.27 The 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196528 provided federal funding to the states for 
development of expanded special education programs and was replaced in 1970 by the Education 
for the Handicapped Act.29 Neither statute, however, conferred individual rights or procedures for 
identifying or serving students as in today’s legislative schema.30 
State legislation developed in the 1970s expanded educational access for children with 
specialized needs.31 Chapter 766 of the Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts,32 enacted in 1972, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Mark C. Weber, Vincent de Paul Professor of Law, at DePaul University College of Law, is the author of Disability Harassment 
(2007), Understanding Disability Law (2007), Special Education Law and Litigation Treatise (3d ed. 2008), and co-author of Special 
Education Law Cases and Material (2d ed. 2007). Society of Vincent de Paul Professors, Mark C. Weber, DEPAUL UNIV., 
http://offices.depaul.edu/svdpp/Members/Pages/Mark-Weber.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
19 151 CONG. REC. S13,399–400 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005); see also COLKER, supra note 9, at 25–27 (“[U]ntil the nineteenth century, 
most individuals with disabilities received no education whatsoever, because they were feared and shunned by society.”). 
20 151 CONG. REC. S13,399–400; COLKER, supra note 9, at 25–27; see also Daniel H. Melvin II, Desegregation of Children with 
Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 670–71 (1995) (noting a congressional preference for mainstreaming, but cautioning that each 
child’s case must be scrutinized). 
21 COLKER, supra note 9, at 25–27; see also Melvin, supra note 20, at 603–04.  
22 See 151 CONG. REC. S13,399–400. 
23 COLKER, supra note 9, at 26–27. 
24 Id. (citing State ex. rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 172 N.W. 153 (Wis. 1919)). 
25 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
26 Theresa M. DeMonte, Comment, Finding the Least Restrictive Environment for Preschoolers Under the IDEA: An Analysis and 
Proposed Framework, 85 WASH. L. REV. 157, 160–61 (2010); Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 
2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 189, 192 (2006); Melvin, supra note 20, at 607.  
27 See Beyer, supra note 8, at 367.  
28 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27.  
29 Id.; Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 84 Stat. 175; Gordon, supra note 12, at 276 (noting that the EHA sought 
to stimulate development of resources and personnel without further guidelines).  
30 Beyer, supra note 8, at 367–68. 
31 Beyer, supra note 8, at 367 (citing Comptroller General of the United States, Disparities Still Exist in Who Gets Special Education 3 
(Sept. 30, 1981)) (“Prior to 1971, many state statutes contained provisions excluding from the educational system children with certain 
physical or mental conditions. In 1970, only fourteen states had statutes mandating appropriate education to children with handicaps. 
By 1974, however, this number had grown to forty-six.”). 
32 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 766 (1972) (current version at ch. 71(b) (West 2015).  
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was notable among those statutes.33 Characterized as “the broadest and most comprehensive law 
regulating special education in the nation at the time,”34 Chapter 766 required identification, 
evaluation and provision of a proper educational program pursuant to a team-formulated 
individualized educational plan and placement of the child in the least restrictive program.35 This 
statute, in particular, has been called a model for the federal special education legislation enacted 
in the mid-1970s.36 
Concurrently, and in response to the continual exclusion of close to eight million students 
with special needs from public schools, disability advocates sought remedies in the courts.37 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (“PARC”),38 decided in 1971, 
and Mills v. Board of Education,39 decided in 1972, are credited with having spurred the 
enactment of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,40 which ultimately evolved 
into the IDEA.41 The facts of PARC and Mills illustrate the nature and extent of exclusion from 
public education that led to enactment of what ultimately became the IDEA.  
PARC was a class action suit concerning mentally retarded persons aged six to twenty-
one.42 The decision enforced a consent agreement that required the State of Pennsylvania to 
provide, inter alia, “access to a free public program of education and training appropriate to [the] 
learning capacities to every mentally retarded child of the same age.”43 Additionally, the 
agreement stated that “among the alternative programs of education and training required by 
statute to be available, placement in a regular public school class [was] preferable to placement in 
a special public school class and placement in a special public school class [would be] preferable 
to placement in any other type of program of education and training.”44 Colker credits PARC with 
articulation of the integration presumption.45 
The seven plaintiffs in Mills were either intellectually disabled or exhibited behavioral 
problems due to emotional disturbance or hyperactivity.46 They were excluded from school 
without hearings, placed in alternative schools, denied re-entry or excluded because the school 
could not afford them an appropriate education program.47 The Mills plaintiffs sought to enjoin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Gordon, supra note 12, at 263; Wilkens, supra note 8. 
34 Gordon, supra note 12, at 263. 
35 Id. at 266–69. 
36 Id. at 263. 
37 See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3, § 601(b)(1), 89 Stat. 773, 774 (“Congress 
finds that . . . there are more than eight million handicapped children in the United States today . . . .”); see also id. sec. 3, § 601(b)(4), 
89 Stat. 773, 774 (“one million of the handicapped children in the United States are excluded entirely from the public school system 
. . . .”); see also Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify You, Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability Classification 
Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 614 (2009) (noting that Congressional studies revealed massive exclusion of disabled students 
from public schools; see also Gordon, supra note 26, at 189, 192 (noting that despite legislative response to historical exclusion of 
disabled students from public schools, it remains debatable whether inclusion or mainstreaming are the “best” settings). 
38 Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).  
39 Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).  
40 Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.  
41 See Colker, supra note 1, at 804–06; Melvin, supra note 20, at 601; Rebecca Weber Goldman, Comment, A Free Appropriate 
Education in the Least Restrictive Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken By The Individuals with Disabilities in Education 
Act, 20 UNIV. DAYTON L. REV. 243 (1994); Gordon, supra note 12, at 284–88; Beyer, supra note 8, at 368 (crediting PARC and Mills 
with prompting congressional action to increase funding devoted to educating the handicapped). 
42 Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 282. 
43 Id. at 303. 
44 Id. at 307. 
45 Colker, supra note 1, at 803–04. 
46 Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972). 
47 Id. 
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the District of Columbia School District from refusing provision of a public education,48 alleging 
that, with special services, they could be educated in regular classrooms or in special classrooms 
tailored to their needs in public schools. Borrowing the argument from Brown, they successfully 
argued that failure to provide special education was akin to racial segregation and those in need of 
special education had due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to a hearing prior to 
expulsion.49 The district court entered a final decree requiring provision of “a free and suitable 
publicly-supported education regardless of the degree of the child’s mental, physical or emotional 
disability or impairment.”50 The Mills decree ordered staffing of a special education department 
that would compile a list identifying causes for nonattendance, including “educable mentally 
retarded, trainable mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, specific learning disability, 
crippled/other health impaired, hearing impaired, visually impaired, multiple handicapped.”51 
Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Amendments in 1974 (“EHA”), 
which required states to develop: 
 
[P]rocedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped 
children, including children in public or private institutions or other care 
facilities, are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that special 
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the 
regular education environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the 
handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary 
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily . . . .52 
 
The legal guarantees of the IDEA, however, were born with enactment of the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (“Public Law 94-142”) in November of 1975.53 Public Law 94-142 
specifically articulated the goal of educating disabled students with their non-disabled peers.54 
Elements of PARC and Mills, were incorporated in Public Law 94-142—in effect codifying the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 876; Keaney, supra note 14, at 832; see Monserud, supra note 12, at 688; see Beyer, supra note 8, at 364–65; see also 
DeMonte, supra note 26, at 160–61 (exploring the application of the LRE concept to preschool placements and stating that “[t]he 
IDEA had its genesis in a movement of parents and educators fighting to secure public education for children with disabilities” that 
was inspired from “the broader civil rights movement . . . .”). 
50 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878. 
51 Id. at 879; see also id. at 878–83 (requiring a due process and hearing procedure, as well as individual plans for each child in 
addition to the identification component).  
52 Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 613(a)(13)(B), 88 Stat. 484, 582; see also Colker, supra note 1, at 805, n.66.  
53 Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773; see also Colker, supra note 1, at 806. 
54 See Colker, supra note 1, at 794–95; see Jennifer M. Saba, Undue Deference: Toward A Dual System of Burdens Under the 
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 133, 140 (2007). 
6
Children's Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol35/iss3/4
2015]                                             Least Restrictive Environment                                                235            235 
	  
holdings of those cases.55 Congress amended Public Law 94-142 several times and its name 
changed to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act in the 1990 amendments.56  
The basic guarantees of the law have remained constant since the initial enactment in 
1975 to the present.57 Funding under the IDEA, like its predecessor, is dependent upon 
satisfaction of three requirements: (1) identification of all children entitled to classification under 
the Act,58 (2) providing qualified children with an individualized and “Free Appropriate Public 
Education,”59 and (3) delivered in the LRE.60 The IDEA confers procedural guarantees assuring 
parents of an active role in the process of deciding the components of their child’s individualized 
education program (“IEP”).61 The Act also provides an administrative process with direct appeal 
to federal or state court.62  
The 1997 amendments to the IDEA added a provision permitting parents to seek private 
school tuition reimbursement if their school district has failed to make a FAPE available.63 That 
provision is titled “[p]ayment for education of children enrolled in private schools without 
consent of or referral by the public agency” and states: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 “The Education Amendments of 1974 . . . added important new provisions to the [EHA, requiring] States to: establish a goal of 
providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children; provide procedures for insuring that handicapped children and 
their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards in decision regarding identification, evaluation, and educational 
placement of handicapped children; establish procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, 
including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not handicapped; and that 
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular education environment occurs only 
when the nature of severity of the handicapped is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily . . . .” 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430, 1432, 1975 WL 12452, at *8 (Leg. Hist.); see Pub. L. 
No. 94-142, sec. 3, § 601(b)(8), 89 Stat. 773, 775; see also Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3, § 601(b)(9), 89 Stat. 773, 775 (“[I]t is in the 
national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of 
handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law . . . .”).  
56 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103; 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1784 
(1990). The IDEA was further amended in 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587 (1994), in 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17 (1997), and 
in 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446 (2004). 
57 Saba, supra note 54, at 138; Gordon, supra note 26, at 194–96. The 1997 amendments included greater specification of the IEP 
team, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 614(d)(1)(B), 111 Stat. 37, 85 (1997), and expanded the contents of the IEP, making it a comprehensive 
document with the objective of enabling a child “to be involved and progress in the general curriculum.” Pub. L. No. 105-17, 
§ 614(d)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii), 111 Stat. 37, 84–85.  
58 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2012) (describing the “child find” requirement). 
59 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (requiring a state to submit a plan to the Secretary of Education reflecting policies guaranteeing 
availability of a FAPE “to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of [three] and [twenty-one], inclusive, 
including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school”).  
60 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
61 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2012) (providing for the development of an IEP for each child classified as disabled under the IDEA that 
specifies the setting in which a child is to be educated, the supplemental services and modifications, as well as annual goals).  
62 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2012); see also N.Y.S. Ed. Law § 4404(1), 8 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.5(h)–(l) (setting forth requirements for 
mediation or the impartial due process hearing procedure). New York has a two-tiered administrative procedure. The initial complaint 
is heard by an Officer (“IHO”). N.Y.S. Ed. Law § 4404(1); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.5(i), (j). An appeal may be taken to the second level for 
review by a State Review Officer (“SRO”). N.Y.S. Ed. Law § 4404(2); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.5(k). Final determinations of the SRO may 
be appealed to either the state supreme or federal district court. N.Y.S. Ed. Law § 4404(3); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.5(l). 
63 20 U.S.C. § 1412(10)(C)(ii); see Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 
612(a)(10)(C)(ii), 111 Stat. 39, 63; C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Katie 
Harrison, Direct Tuition Payments Under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act: Equal Remedies For Equal Harm, 25 J. 
CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 873, 880–81 (2011) (arguing that the statute should explicitly allow for prospective reimbursement for 
unilateral private school enrollment where a public school district has failed to make a FAPE available). Exception is taken to Ms. 
Harris’s suggested language to the extent that it would require a child to have “received special education and related services under 
the authority of a public agency . . . .” Id. at 902. This is antithetical to Forest Grove School District v. T.A., which justified tuition 
reimbursement after finding a FAPE deprivation where parents provided the school district with independent evaluations and the 
school district refused to provide an IEP and special education services were never delivered within the public school. Forest Grove 
Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 240 (2009).  
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A court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for 
the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had 
not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely 
manner prior to that enrollment.64 
 
Thus, parents now have two avenues available: (1) initiate an administrative due process 
proceeding to force their local educational authority to accommodate a child in the mainstream 
classroom or (2) enroll their child in a private school—generally specialized—and initiate a due 
process proceeding for tuition reimbursement. But the statute fails to provide guidance as to 
whether parents must take the statute’s mainstreaming preference into account when selecting a 
private school. 
The last significant amendments to the IDEA were made in 2004.65 The currently-stated 
purpose of the IDEA focuses on providing children with disabilities an education “designed to 
meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent 
living.”66 This reflects a positive shift in focus away from a pure integrationist agenda and 
towards a qualitative agenda that considers long-term outcomes. 
Very little legislative history reflects the intention underlying the LRE preference.67 
Weber notes that the source for the “(integration) presumption’s pedigree” was in “educational 
theory and practice” in the 1970s and that “the presumption is only tangentially related to 
deinstitutionalization.”68 The integration presumption was adopted in Public Law 94-142, which 
amended the EHA in 1975.69 Incidentally, it was only then that PARC70 and Mills71 were 
mentioned as inspiration for the act.72  
The LRE requirement remains a part of the statute and case law has established tests to 
determine whether a school district has complied with that mandate. Where a parent has selected 
a private alternative, there is a split among the circuits as to whether the restrictiveness of the 
alternative educational placement may be considered.73 There is a trend to consider restrictiveness 
of a unilateral private school selection, but it is a deemphasized factor in determining the 
appropriateness. Rather, the focus is on whether private school provides children with what they 
need to make progress and restrictiveness is incidental. One could envision a rare incident where 
restrictiveness might be a legitimate concern. The U.S. Supreme Court has not articulated 
standards by which a public school district must comply with the mainstreaming mandate, nor has 
it addressed the issue of whether restrictiveness of a unilaterally-selected private placement 
should be considered in resolving tuition reimbursement disputes.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). 
65 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1450. 
66 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
67 Colker, supra note 1, at 807; see Weber, supra note 9, at 178.  
68 See Weber, supra note 9, at 179. 
69 Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773; see also Colker, supra note 1, at 795. 
70 Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 283 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (noting that the plaintiffs’ claims 
implicated equal protection issues).  
71 Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).  
72 Colker, supra note 1, at 805–06; see also S. Rep. No. 168, at 22–23 (1975) (citing Judge Waddy’s opinion in Mills).  
73 See infra notes 100–05.  
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III. TESTS ADOPTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER A SCHOOL DISTRICT HAS COMPLIED WITH THE 
LRE REQUIREMENT 
 
A. Major Cases Articulating Tests to Determine Whether the LRE Requirement has been Satisfied 
by Public Schools: Roncker, Daniel R.R., Greer, Oberti, Rachel H., and Newington 
 The IDEA requires that qualified students be provided a FAPE.74 No further qualitative 
description of what constitutes an “appropriate” education appears in the statute and is instead 
provided in case law.75 The statute also requires states to effect policies permitting qualified 
students to be educated in the LRE.76 Specifically, the statute states that: 
 
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated 
with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or 
other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is 
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.77 
 
These two cornerstone mandates appear in separate subsections with no indication of whether 
they are interrelated or whether one has precedence over the other.78 Courts have articulated three 
tests to determine whether a school district has offered an educational setting that complies with 
the LRE requirement.   
The first test, enunciated by the Sixth Circuit in Roncker v. Walter,79 acknowledged that 
the issue of improper exclusion from a public school implicated different factors than the inquiry 
of whether the child’s education was “appropriate.”80 In evaluating what constituted the LRE, the 
Sixth Circuit stated that the following factors should be considered: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012).  
75 In Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the 
Supreme Court held that an “appropriate” education meant nothing more than provision of a “basic floor of opportunity,” as reflected 
by passing grades and advancement from grade to grade. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200–01. The child in Rowley was a hearing-impaired 
student enrolled in a regular class. Id. at 184. Her parents argued that an in-class sign language interpreter was necessary to achieve a 
FAPE. Id. The Court held that the child had been provided with an appropriate education since she was provided with “personalized 
instruction and related services” meeting her personal needs that allowed her to advance from grade to grade. Id. at 209–10. Justices 
White, Brennan, and Marshall vigorously dissented. These Justices criticized the majority opinion for being at odds with the statute’s 
intent to provide equal educational opportunity and pointed to legislative history indicating that the objective was to allow 
handicapped children “to achieve their maximum potential.” Id. at 214. The majority opinion noted that the legislative history relied 
upon by the dissent represented a passing comment and that when, as here, a statute requires action in exchange for funding, it 
functions as a contract whose requirements must be unambiguously stated. Id. at 204. Nonetheless, the low standard set by Rowley 
remains good law. 
76 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). 
77 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
78 See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he act does not . . . provide any substantive 
standards for striking the proper balance between its requirement for mainstreaming and its mandate for a free appropriate public 
education.”). 
79 Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (Oct. 3, 1983). In Roncker, the school offered 
segregated placement to a mentally retarded child that the IHO found overly restrictive and ordered placement of the child in a special 
class in a regular elementary school. Id. at 1061. The Ohio State Board of Education reversed, agreeing with the school district that the 
segregated setting offered educational opportunities that the child needed and that integration could be accomplished outside of the 
classroom. Id. The district court also ruled in favor of school district. Id. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded because the district 
court reviewed the administrative determination for “abuse of discretion” rather than by according “due weight” to the state 
proceedings. Id. at 1062.  
80 Id. at 1062–63. 
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In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should 
determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be 
feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the 
segregated school would be inappropriate under the [Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975].81 
 
The court further noted that cost was a “proper factor” to be considered, but could not be used as 
a defense by a school district that had “failed to use its funds to provide a proper continuum of 
alternative placements for handicapped children.”82  
 The Fifth Circuit rejected the Roncker test in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education83 as 
too intrusive on local autonomy.84 Daniel R.R. also rejected an emphasis on educational benefit, 
noting that nonacademic benefit must be considered.85 Accordingly, the Daniel R.R. court stated 
that the determination of whether a school district has satisfied the mandate of providing an 
education to a handicapped child in the LRE requires exploration of the following, nonexhaustive 
list of factors: (1) “whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids 
and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child;” (2) “whether the school has 
mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate;” (3) the child’s overall experience, 
including non-academic benefits; and (4) the effect of the child on rest of the class either through 
disruptive behavior or because the other students’ needs will be ignored because the child needs 
excessive attention.86 The parties did not raise the issue of cost, but the court noted that cost may 
properly be considered.87 The Daniel R.R. test quickly superseded the Roncker test. 
 The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Greer v. Rome City School 
District.88 The parents in Greer were intent on enrolling their child, who had Down Syndrome, 
intellectual impairment, and communications deficits, in a general education program in their 
community school.89 The school district was intent on enrolling the child in a specialized class at 
a different school with inclusion in non-academic school activities.90 An independent evaluator 
opined that the child would benefit from having peer models to imitate.91 Neither party suggested 
placement in a regular classroom with related services and supports such as a resource room, an 
itinerant special education teacher in the classroom and curriculum modification.92 The 
administrative proceeding leading to the appellate level review was brought by the school district 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Id. at 1063. 
82 Id. 
83 Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1039. In Daniel R.R., the parents of a child with Down syndrome sought placement of their child in a 
regular class. Id. at 1038–39. But the child “failed to master any of the skills being taught” in the regular class and suitable 
modification would have changed the curriculum “almost beyond recognition.” Id. at 1039. Thus, placement of the child in a special 
education class was upheld because the child failed to attain any benefit in the regular classroom, even with provision of supplemental 
supports and services. Id. at 1046. The district court affirmed the IHO’s ruling in favor of the school district, which granted summary 
judgment on the grounds that the child could not receive educational benefit in the regular program. Id. at 1046. The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed, applying a different analysis that did not look to academic benefit, but to whether the district placement decision complied 
with the mainstreaming preference. .Id. at 1050. 
84 Id. at 1046; see also Keaney, supra note 14, at 835–36 (agreeing that integration is important, but that its efficacy is undermined by 
teacher attitudes). 
85 Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.  
86 Id. at 1048–49; see also L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 976–77 (10th Cir. 2004).  
87 Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991), withdrawn and remanded 967 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(remanding for determination of whether decision appealed from was a final order, resulting in consent order reflecting that all 
pending issues had been resolved), reinstated 967 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992). 
88 Greer, 950 F.2d at 696. 
89 Id. at 690–91. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 692. 
92 Id. at 691–92. 
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seeking approval of its offer of a placement in a segregated class.93 The regional hearing officer 
and state hearing officer both ruled in favor of the school district on the grounds that the school’s 
placement would promote the child’s academic advancement.94 The district court held that 
supplemental aids and services should have been considered as a means to accommodate the child 
in a regular classroom and that the self-contained classroom was therefore overly restrictive.95 On 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it was following the Fifth Circuit and applying a two-
pronged test to evaluate whether a child has been offered the opportunity to be educated in the 
LRE.96 Specifically, the court stated that it would look to (1) whether a child could be educated 
“satisfactorily” in a regular class with supplemental supports and services and (2) if not, and if the 
child is placed in a special class, whether the child has been mainstreamed “to the maximum 
extent appropriate.” The court also followed the Fifth Circuit in admonishing that the inquiry is 
highly individualized and no single factor, including educational benefit, predominates.97  
In Oberti v. Board of Education,98 the Third Circuit explicitly rejected the Roncker test as 
being insufficiently integrationist.99 The court stated that the Roncker test “fails to make clear that 
even if placement in the regular classroom cannot be achieved satisfactorily for the major portion 
of a particular child’s education program, the school is still required to include that child . . . .” in 
activities with nondisabled children “wherever possible.”100 Instead, the court adopted and further 
expanded the Daniel R.R. test to consider steps taken by the school to accomplish inclusion and 
compliance with 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(a),101 mandating provision of “a continuum of alternative 
placements.”102  
In Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H.,103 the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
following test to evaluate whether there has been compliance with the IDEA’s mainstreaming 
mandate: (1) educational benefits in a regular classroom, supplemented with appropriate aids and 
services, as compared with educational benefits of special class; (2) non-academic benefits of 
interaction with non-disabled children; (3) the effect of the child’s presence on the teacher and 
other children on the classroom, considering (a) whether “the child was disruptive, distracting or 
unruly” and (b) whether “the child would take up so much of the teacher’s time that other 
students would suffer from lack of attention”; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming.104 The Rachel H. 
blend of the Roncker and Daniel R.R. tests is more holistic and balanced.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Id. at 692. The school district had initiated a hearing seeking to have an evaluation mandated that would justify their placement offer 
in a self-contained special class. Id. at 691. 
94 Id. at 693. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 696. 
97 Id. at 696–97. 
98 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Clemton Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993). When the district proposed a special education 
placement the parents filed a due process complaint. Id. at 1208. The IHO found in favor of the school district. Id. at 1209. The district 
court reversed and ordered the district to develop an inclusion plan. Id. at 1212. The Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1224. 
99 Id. at 1215.  
100 Id.  
101 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 states: “(a) Each public agency shall ensure that a continuum of alternative placements is available to meet the 
needs of children with disabilities for special education and related services. (b) The continuum required in paragraph (a) of this 
section must—(1) Include the alternative placements listed in the definition of special education under § 300.26 (instruction in regular 
classes, special classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions); and (2) Make provision for 
supplementary services (such as resource room or itinerant instruction) to be provided in conjunction with regular class placement.”  
102 Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218.  
103 Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1993). In Rachel H., the parents sought to have their 
mildly mentally retarded daughter educated in a regular class with support services. Id. at 1400. During pendency of the dispute, the 
child attended regular classes at a private school. Id. A hearing officer held for parents and the district court affirmed. Id. at 1400. The 
Ninth circuit affirmed, adopting the Daniel R.R. and Greer-influenced four-part test. Id. at 1404. 
104 Id. at 1404. 
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 It was not until 2008 that the Second Circuit articulated which LRE test it would adopt. 
Specifically, P. v. Newington Board of Education105 adopted the Daniel R.R. test with 
consideration of the factors enumerated in Oberti.106 The Second Circuit acknowledged that the 
LRE requirement in the IDEA is not an “all or nothing” integrationist policy and that the 
educational facet was an “equally important objective.”107 Time could easily account for this 
distinction; Daniel R.R., Greer, Oberti, and Rachel H. all predated the 1997 IDEA amendments. 
Newington came afterward, and the 1997 amendments sought to “place emphasis on what is best 
educationally for children with disabilities” and reflected a concern with the “critical issue” of 
placing “greater emphasis on improving student performance . . . .”108 
The tests enunciated in Roncker, Daniel R.R., Oberti, Rachel H., and Newington are 
reasonable in instances where parents are seeking inclusion of their children in public school 
settings. These tests promote legitimate policy objectives of preventing public school districts 
from excluding children and honoring their mainstreaming obligations. The considerations—
policy or otherwise—are completely different where parents feel that their child’s educational 
needs have not been met in the public system.  
B. Cases Setting Standards for Evaluating Educational Settings Selected by Parents and Where 
Public School Districts have Asserted Restrictiveness as a Defense 
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Florence County School District Four v. 
Carter.109 Carter established the rule that where a local educational authority has failed to offer a 
child a FAPE, the parents may enroll the child in a private school and seek tuition reimbursement 
so long as it is determined that the private school is appropriate for that child.110 The 1997 
amendments to the IDEA codified this ruling.111  
Subsequently, School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education112 established 
the standard for determining whether a parent who rejects an IEP and unilaterally places their 
child in private school is entitled to tuition reimbursement. In Burlington, the Supreme Court held 
that “where a court determines that a private placement desired by the parents was proper under 
the Act and that an IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear 
beyond cavil that ‘appropriate’ relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school 
officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing the child in a private 
school.”113 The Court also stated that “equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning 
relief.”114 Subsequently, this has become referred to as the three-pronged Burlington test, which 
considers: (1) whether the school district offered an appropriate program in the IEP, (2) whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing an eight-year-old boy who failed to make progress 
despite numerous services provided and the school’s inclusion efforts and concluding court that the school district had mainstreamed 
the child to the maximum extent appropriate).  
106 Id. at 120–22. 
107 Id. at 122 (“While including students in the regular classroom as much as is practicable is undoubtedly a central goal of the IDEA, 
schools must attempt to achieve that goal in light of the equally important objective of providing an education appropriately tailored to 
each student's particular needs.”).  
108 S. REP. NO. 105-17 (1997). 
109 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993).  
110 Id. at 15. 
111 See 20 U.S.C.§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2012) (“A court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the 
cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available 
to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment.”); see also Michael J. Tentindo, Private School Tuition At The Public’s 
Expense: A Disabled Student’s Right To A Free Appropriate Public Education, 17 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 81, 85 
(2009). 
112 Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1996). Though Burlington pre-dates the 1997 IDEA amendments 
permitting private school tuition reimbursement, it remains the test for determining whether tuition reimbursement is warranted. 
113 Id. at 370.  
114 Id. at 374.  
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the alternative selected by the parents was appropriate, and (3) whether the equities favor the 
parents.115  
Carter established that private schools selected by parents are not subject to the same 
standards as public schools.116 Private schools in which parents unilaterally place their children 
will not be deemed ‘inappropriate’ because they do not develop IEPs, do not have state-certified 
teachers or are not on a list of state-approved schools.117 The Court did not otherwise address 
factors that should be considered in determining the appropriateness of a parent’s unilateral 
school selection.118 The Court, however, did not mention whether the parent’s unilateral private 
school selection can be scrutinized for restrictiveness. Moreover, codification of Carter in 20 
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) does not specify factors that should be considered in assessing a parent’s 
selection.119 The Court was silent on the issue of whether alternative placements selected by a 
parent must comply with the IDEA’s mainstreaming preference in particular.120 Thus, the factor 
of restrictiveness remains in play. For example, the Sixth121 and Eighth Circuits122 do not consider 
restrictiveness in evaluating the appropriateness of a unilateral enrollment.123 The Third Circuit 
has adhered to this position in some, but not all cases.124 The Second Circuit considers 
restrictiveness, but in an extremely well-reasoned recent decision. In C.L. v. Scarsdale Union 
Free School District, the Second Circuit de-emphasized that lone factor, looking, instead, to the 
qualitative aspects of the private alternative selected by the parents.125 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 See Carter, 510 U.S. at 12–13; Walczak v. Fla. Union Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 128–29 (2d Cir. 1998); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. 
T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 236 (2009); R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (“This framework is known as 
the Burlington/Carter test.”); see also Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 369 (2d Cir. 2006) (referring to the first 
two prongs of the test only), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007). Section 1415(b)(2)(6)(A)(iii) provides that, after consideration of “a 
preponderance of the evidence” a court “shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)(2)(6)(A)(iii) (2012).  
116 Carter, 510 U.S at 14. 
117 Id. at 13–14.  
118 Some people interpret the Court’s reference to the decisions below in regard to the significant academic progress made by the child 
at issue as indicating an ‘appropriateness’ standard differing from the de minimis standard established in Board of Education of 
Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982). 
119 Case law reflects what parents need not prove. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364. To wit—parents do not need to show that their 
placement meets IDEA standards for a FAPE, they do not need to show that the private school meets state standards or requirements, 
and unilateral selections are not subject to the same mainstreaming mandate as public schools. Id. at 364. All parents need to show is 
that the unilateral placement provides “educational instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped 
child” that enable the child to benefit from instruction. Id. at 365 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188–89). In C.L., influential factors in 
the finding that the unilateral placement was appropriate included consideration of the Eagle Hill program, including such factors as 
class size, close oversight, as well as the child’s progress as demonstrated by his increased enthusiasm for school, his increased 
confidence, and improvement in expressing himself and working independently. Id. at 834. The S.R.O.’s decision in C.L. accepting 
Scarsdale’s argument that the child had progressed in the public school illustrates that the determination of whether a child gains 
“appropriate” educational benefit offered by a public school program can be dangerously subjective. Id. F.3d at 834–35. 
120 See Carter, 510 U.S. at 13–14. 
121 Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 400 (6th Cir. 1998). 
122 C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011). 
123 In Board of Education Murphysboro v. Illinois State Board of Education, the court noted that the restrictiveness of the unilateral 
placement was irrelevant, since the placement offered by the public school district was inappropriate and no other appropriate public 
placements were made available. Bd. of Educ. Murphysboro v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, faced 
with only one option, its restrictiveness was a non-issue. Id. at 1168. The court explicitly stated “the mainstreaming requirement was 
developed in response to school districts which were reluctant to integrate mentally-impaired children and their non-disabled peers. It 
was not developed to promote integration with non-disabled peers at the expense of other IDEA educational requirements and is 
applicable only if the IEP meets IDEA minimums.” Id. at 1168. 
124 Warren G. v. Cumberland Cnty. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999); Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
125 C.L. v. Scarsdale Unions Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 839 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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In Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School District v. Boss, the Sixth Circuit 
considered a claim for private school tuition reimbursement.126 After their child failed to progress 
in reading skills, Boss enrolled her child in a private school and sued the public school district for 
tuition reimbursement, which the court awarded.127 The school district personnel asserted that the 
private school did not meet the IDEA’s mainstreaming requirements.128 The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the determination that the IEP was inappropriate and held that mainstreaming was a 
requirement that is not applicable to a private school alternative selected by a parent.129 The court 
specifically pointed out that the IDEA did not envision creating an untenable situation forcing 
parents to choose among “unpalatable alternatives” of paying for specialized private education or 
letting their child “languish” in a public institution failing to provide an appropriate education.130 
The court noted that a limitation requiring unilateral placements to satisfy the IDEA’s 
mainstreaming requirement would “vitiate the remedy.”131 In Knable v. Bexley,132 when the 
school district defended a tuition reimbursement claim by asserting that the private school 
selected by the parent was not the LRE, the Sixth Circuit noted that a school district cannot hide 
behind the shield of the mainstreaming requirement where it has not provided a student with a 
FAPE133. 
In C.B. v. Special School District No. 1,134 the Eighth Circuit declined to accept 
restrictiveness of environment as a defense to a claim for tuition reimbursement under the 
IDEA.135 The child at issue was dyslexic.136 The parents kept the child in public school through 
fifth grade.137 At that point, they unilaterally enrolled him in a specialized school and sued for 
tuition reimbursement.138 The public school had offered a program that served learning-disabled 
students with behavioral issues.139 The district court held that the public school district had failed 
to offer a FAPE.140 However, the district court also held that the services offered at the segregated 
private school could have been offered at the specialized public school program.141 The district 
court denied tuition reimbursement because the specialized public school program constituted the 
LRE.142 The Eighth Circuit reversed and stated that it joined the position of the Third and Sixth 
Circuits “that a private placement need not satisfy [an LRE] requirement to be ‘proper’ under the 
[IDEA].”143 
The Third Circuit’s position as to whether the restrictiveness of a parent’s private school 
selection should be considered in evaluating the right to reimbursement is unclear. In Warren G. 
v. Cumberland County School District, the Third Circuit held that the LRE requirement was not a 
factor in determining the appropriateness of a private school selected by a parent after the public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Boss, 144 F.3d at 392. 
127 The suit involved a claim for two consecutive school years, 1993–1994 and 1994–1995. Tuition for 1993–1994 was not awarded 
because the appeal from the administrative decision was untimely. Id.  
128 Id. at 400. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 400 n.7. 
132 Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2001). 
133 Id. at 770.  
134 C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011). 
135 Id. at 991. 
136 Id. at 986. 
137 Id. at 985–86. 
138 Id. at 986. 
139 Id. at 985. 
140 Id. at 986. 
141 Id. at 986–87. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 991. 
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educational authority’s failure to offer a FAPE.144 Dissatisfied with the IEP offered by the school 
district, the parents in this case removed their children to a specialized private school serving 
children with specific learning disabilities.145 At the appellate level, the public school district 
asserted that the private school selected by the parents was inappropriate because it was a 
restrictive environment.146 The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that “imposition of the 
[LRE] requirement on private placements would vitiate the parental right of unilateral 
withdrawal.”147 However, in Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis,148 though parent’s choice of school was 
not challenged on the grounds of restrictiveness of the setting, the court nonetheless stated that “a 
private placement is ‘proper’ if it (1) is ‘appropriate,’ i.e., it provides ‘significant learning’ and 
confers ‘meaningful benefit,’ and (2) is provided in the least restrictive educational 
environment.”149 The court in DeFlaminis cited to Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E.150 for 
this proposition.151 The Ridgewood court stated: “[a] private placement may be proper if it is 
appropriate and provided in the least restrictive educational environment” and referred to the 
Oberti standards in assessing whether the parent’s private placement constituted the least 
restrictive educational environment.152  
In the Second Circuit, restrictiveness is still a factor used to assess the appropriateness of 
a parent’s unilateral private school selection. In Muller v. East Islip School District, 
restrictiveness of the private school selected by a parent was considered in assessing the 
appropriateness of the parental choice.153 However, the parents’ choice was otherwise 
educationally appropriate and sufficient to overcome the educational setting’s restrictiveness.154 
Frank G. v. Board of Education, however, stated that parents are not required to consider the 
restrictiveness of a school they select.155 The primary inquiry is on “educational benefit” and 
whether the education meets the child’s individually unique needs.156 This places parents in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Warren G. ex rel. Tom G. v. Cumberland Cnty. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 83–84 (3d Cir. 1999). 
145 Id. at 82.  
146 Id. at 83.  
147 Id. at 84; see also A.Y. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 569 F. Supp. 2d 496, 502, 511–12 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that while 
appropriateness and restrictiveness are factors to be considered in evaluating a private placement, greater weight is given to 
appropriateness, but holding that administrative record was insufficient to determine appropriateness of private placement in that 
particular case); Coleman v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 983 F. Supp. 2d 543, 568 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (holding that restrictiveness of private 
placement does not render it “‘inappropriate’ for reimbursement purposes”). 
148 Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 259 (3d Cir. 2007). 
149 Id. at 276 (citing Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
150 Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 238 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that a less restrictive, but inappropriate 
setting is not preferable to a more restrictive setting that provides a child with an appropriate education. In other words, educational 
appropriateness should not be sacrificed in favor of a less restrictive setting. However, the appellate court remanded the issue on 
whether the private placement was considered to the district court).  
151 Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 276.  
152 N.E., 172 F.3d at 248 (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Clemton Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
153 Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ. of E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 95, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
failure to classify child as disabled was improper); see also M.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 532 U.S. 942 (noting that parents had failed to establish that education provided at their selected private school served their 
child’s educational needs and that it was an overly restrictive setting); L.K. ex rel. Q. v. Ne. Sch. Dist., 932 F. Supp. 2d 467, 492 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that parents failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that specialized school met their child’s education and 
social needs); Weaver v. Millbrook Cent. Sch. Dist., 812 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that parents failed to 
demonstrate that specialized school was appropriate for their child or that child could not succeed in a mainstream environment).  
154 Muller, 145 F.3d at 105.  
155 Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 364 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007) (stating that the 
ultimate issue is whether the unilateral placement meets the child’s unique needs and enables them to receive educational benefit).  
156 Id. at 364–65; see also M.S., 231 F.3d at 100–01 (noting that the SRO found that private placement was inappropriate both because 
it failed to address child’s spelling and language needs and failed to produce progress in those areas and because it was overly 
restrictive). 
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bind. While they do not do not have to consider restrictiveness in selecting a private school when 
they feel FAPE has been denied, they still must be prepared to confront a school district challenge 
or judicial scrutiny on those very grounds. More recently in C.L., the Second Circuit clarified the 
weight to be given to ‘restrictiveness’ in evaluating a private school selected by a parent whose 
child has not been offered a FAPE.157 Specifically, on appeal, the C.L. court held that 
restrictiveness alone is an improper ground to deem an alternative selected by the parent as 
inappropriate.158  
The child in C.L. had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(“ADHD”), a nonverbal learning disability executive function weakness.159 C.L. attended public 
school from kindergarten through third grade.160 When C.L. was in kindergarten in school year 
2004–2005, the school developed a Section 504 Accommodation Plan (“504 plan”).161 This plan 
remained in place throughout C.L.’s tenure in the public school and, among other things, 
provided occupational therapy, pull-out services in the school’s learning center and speech and 
language therapy.162 During the spring of C.L.’s third-grade year, his parents arranged for several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 See C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826 (2d Cir. 2014).  
158 Id. at 839. The court was influenced by the IHO’s findings of “progress” reflected in objective test scores, but also in evidence 
about the child’s increased enthusiasm about attending school, his improvement in expression, and improved ability to work 
independently. Id. at 834.  
159 Amanda Morin, Understanding Executive Functioning Issues, UNDERSTOOD FOR LEARNING & ATTENTION ISSUES, 
https://www.understood.org/en/learning-attention-issues/child-learning-disabilities/executive-functioning-issues/understanding-
executive-functioning-issues (last visited Apr. 25, 2015) (explaining how executive function affects the ability to plan, organize, 
strategize, pay attention, remember details, or to manage time, including keeping track of time and finishing work on time or asking 
for help).  
160 C.L., 744 F.3d at 832. 
161 Id. at 832. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that:  
(a) No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705 
of this title, shall, solely by reason of he or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . . 
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “program or activity” means all of the operations of . . .  
. . . . 
(2)(B) a local educational agency (as defined in section 7801 of [the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965]), system of vocational education, or other school system.  
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). Eligibility for an IEP does not necessarily establish a disability under 
Section 504. Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 572 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir. 2009). Qualification for protection under Section 504 as a 
disabled person is determined by reference to regulations contained in the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 820. Key to 
qualification is “substantial limitation” of a “major life activity.” Id. The purposes of the IDEA and Section 504 differ, however, in 
that “Section 504 provides relief from discrimination, but the IDEA [provides] relief from inappropriate educational placement 
decisions, regardless of discrimination.” Id. at 821–22. Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA is a requirement for 
asserting claims under Section 504 for relief that is also cognizable under the IDEA. Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 
F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012). In C.L., the court stated that relief under Section 504 is predicated 
on a showing of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” and that this was not shown, notwithstanding the district’s failure to classify C.L. 
under the IDEA. C.L., 744 F.3d at 841. 
162 In October of 2004, while he was in kindergarten, C.L. received speech therapy once a week. C.L., 744 F.3d at 832. Pre-reading 
instruction at the school’s learning resource center was started in January of 2005. Id. After an occupational therapy evaluation in 
March 2005, the school convened a committee that determined that C.L. was entitled to a 504 plan. Id. The resultant plan provided for 
one thirty-minute one-on-one pull-out occupational therapy session weekly. Id. at 832. For academic year 2005–2006, the plan was 
revised to provide for weekly speech and language therapy with five other students, pullout-instruction at the learning center in four 
sessions each week with six other students and occupational therapy twice a week in a one-on-one setting and once a week in a group 
of four other students. Id. The only change to C.L.’s 504 plan for school year 2006–2007, second grade, was the elimination of the 
group occupational therapy sessions. Id. Instead, C.L. was assigned occupational therapy sessions twice weekly in a one-on-one 
setting only. Id. Despite his occupational therapy, an independent occupational therapy evaluation revealed that C.L. remained 
impaired. Id. Consequently, his parents arranged for private occupational therapy in May 2007 to address C.L.’s visual-motor 
integration, visual perception, and motor coordination needs. Id. at 832–33. The parents also secured a psychoeducational evaluation 
that showed weaknesses in language, executive functioning and math. Id. at 833. The parents met again with the 504 committee. Id. 
The committee noted, among other things, that C.L. was better able to focus in his small group at the learning center than in class, and 
added fifteen hours of an in-class aide. Id. at 833. In June 2007, the parents secured an independent neurodevelopmental evaluation. 
Id.. That evaluation agreed with the accommodations of the 504 plan, but suggested that the parents investigate specialized schools for 	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evaluations—occupational therapy, psychoeducational and neurodevelopmental—one of which 
suggested that the parents investigate specialized private schools serving students with attentional 
and learning issues.163 As C.L.’s third-grade year, 2007–2008, drew to a close, his parents asked 
that the school district’s Committee on Special Education (“CSE”) review C.L.’s evaluations to 
determine whether he qualified for an IEP.164 The district conducted additional evaluations, but 
ultimately concluded that C.L. was entitled to the Section 504 accommodations only, and not an 
IEP.165 In June 2008, C.L.’s parents notified the district that they were enrolling their son in Eagle 
Hill, “a specialized private school.”166 C.L. progressed in all areas at this school.167 C.L.’s parents 
initiated a due process proceeding seeking tuition reimbursement in June 2009.168  
The impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) concluded that the “substantial array” of 
modifications and services provided to C.L. evidenced that the child should have been classified 
under the IDEA and provided with an IEP.169 The IHO further held that the 504 plan was an 
inadequate substitute for an IEP, since the 504 plan kept C.L. in a general education class that 
was too large for the child.170 The IHO reviewed the services provided at Eagle Hill, the private 
school in which he had been enrolled, discussed the progress he had made at Eagle Hill, and 
concluded that together with consideration of the equities, tuition reimbursement was justified.171 
The State Review Officer (“SRO”) overruled this decision.172 Specifically, the SRO found that 
Eagle Hill’s specialized program could not be deemed appropriate because C.L. had made some 
progress in the general educational setting.173 The “restrictiveness” of the specialized setting—
and only that factor—justified denial of tuition reimbursement to C.L.’s parents.174 The district 
court deferred to the SRO on the grounds that there was evidence supporting the SRO’s 
conclusions.175 But the Second Circuit reversed, noting that it was not eliminating restrictiveness 
as a factor in examining a parent’s selection.176  
The C.L. court noted that parents are not subject to the same educational strictures as 
public school districts and are not bound by the same mainstreaming obligations.177 Citing to 
Carter, the court noted that the mainstreaming requirement was explicitly devised to prevent 
exclusion from public schools and was not meant to “restrict parental options” when failed by 
their public school districts.178 The court stated that “[i]nflexibly requiring that the parents secure 
a private school that is nonrestrictive, or at least as nonrestrictive as the FAPE-denying public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
their son. Id. at 833. In the beginning of school year 2007–2008, as C.L. began third grade, the 504 Committee met again, and this 
time, the parents asked that the committee consider classifying C.L. under the IDEA. Id. at 833–34. After the school district conducted 
its own evaluations, it rejected the request and changed the 504 plan only to the extent of reducing the number of sessions in the 
learning center, because C.L. was resistant to attending. C.L.’s parents moved him to Eagle Hill at the beginning of his fourth grade 
year. Id. at 834. 
163 Id. at 832. 
164 Id. at 833. 
165 Id. at 834. 
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 834–35. 
169 Id. at 835.  
170 Id.  
171 Id. 
172 Id.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 837 (“Hence, while the restrictiveness of a private placement is a factor, by no means is it dispositive.”). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 837 (citing Carter ex rel. Carter v. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 1991)).  
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school, would undermine the right of unilateral withdrawal” and concluded that restrictiveness of 
a private placement is not a dispositive factor.179 The court elaborated, stating: 
 
Restrictiveness may be relevant in choosing between two or more otherwise 
appropriate private placement alternatives, or in considering whether a private 
placement would be more restrictive than necessary to meet the child’s needs, but 
where the public school system denied the child a FAPE, the restrictiveness of 
the private placement cannot be measured against the restrictiveness of the public 
school option.180 
 
The Second Circuit declined to accord the deference ordinarily given to an SRO’s decision since, 
in this case, the SRO failed to engage in a reasoned decision.181 Specifically, the SRO failed to 
consider the services provided at Eagle Hill or C.L.’s progress, whereas the IHO’s decision 
thoroughly considered and discussed these factors.182 The SRO failed to assess “what the school 
had to offer” academically183 and held, in effect, that Eagle Hill was inappropriate because it was 
restrictive.184 Thus, the court reinstated the decision of the IHO that Eagle Hill represented an 
appropriate placement and rewarded tuition reimbursement to C.L.’s parents.185   
The authors’ opinion is that educational benefit should be the sole factor considered in 
evaluating a parent’s private school selection where a FAPE has not been offered or provided. It 
is an undisputed fact that a private school setting, by definition, is a more restrictive environment. 
Moreover, a rule limiting the inquiry to educational benefit is logically consistent with the Carter 
analysis that unilateral private school placements are not subject to the same standards as public 
schools.186  
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
It is no longer reasonable for courts to be overly solicitous of the integration presumption 
at the cost of a child’s education.187 Social conditions existing at the time the IDEA came into 
being were the driving force behind the integration presumption; students were regularly being 
excluded from public education or not being educated at all.188 In point of fact, in Burlington, the 
Court noted that the IDEA reflected a congressional response to “the apparently widespread 
practice of relegating handicapped children to private institutions or warehousing them in special 
classes.”189 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Id. (citations omitted). 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 830. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 839. 
184 Id. at 830, 839. 
185 Id. at 840 
186 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
187 See, e.g., Colker, supra note 1, at 811–12. 
188 Gabriela Brizuela, Making An “IDEA” A Reality: Providing a Free and Appropriate Public Education for Children With 
Disabilities Under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 595, 597, 601 (2011); DeMonte, supra note 
26, at 161; Colker, supra note 1, at 802–05; Perlin, supra note 37, at 614; Gordon, supra note 26, at 189; Melvin, supra note 20, at 
603, 605, 615–17; Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Parent’s Perspective And Proposal For 
Change, 27 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 331, 344–46, 395 (1994) (proposing that an appropriate education be defined as “one designed to lead 
toward full integration or reintegration into the regular public education system . . . .”); Beyer, supra note 8, at 364–65.  
189 Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373 (1996); see also C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 
F.3d 981, 991 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The overriding purpose of the [IDEA] is to provide an education for disabled children that is both free 
and appropriate.”). 
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The climate of society at-large and the educational sector has changed since the 
enactment of the IDEA. Inclusion goals that were normative at the IDEA’s inception are now by 
and large descriptive; today, the notion of excluding a child from a mainstream school on the 
grounds of repugnance would, alone, be unfathomable. However, integration was and is not the 
sole objective of the IDEA. A FAPE is one cornerstone, pitted against the ideal of inclusivity. 
These competing interests create an unresolved tension.190 The 1997 amendments announced a 
commitment to improving and increasing the “educational achievement” of the children served 
under the IDEA, but within public schools.191 The 2004 amendments continued the qualitative 
focus.192 A policy objective requiring public educational agencies to prepare all students, 
including those served by the IDEA, to ultimately function in and contribute to society and the 
economy at-large, to the extent possible, makes good economic sense.193 The focus on 
guaranteeing individually-tailored education that looks to long-term outcomes is a positive. 
The tests applied to determine whether public schools have offered to educate a child in 
the LRE are sufficient to protect the interests of those parents arguing for inclusion.194 However, 
tuition reimbursement lawsuits reflect concerns about the quality of education being delivered in 
the public school and long-term results. More often than not, parents are running away from the 
open public school doors.195 Weber noted that: 
 
[I]n many instances, the children are already in integrated public school 
programs, and whatever is happening is not good. Adequate support services may 
not be offered. Services promised may not be delivered. The general education 
teachers may not be cooperating. Class sizes may be too large. Physical or verbal 
harassment may be occurring. A disability-only school, particularly a private 
school, looks extremely attractive. When parents resist for these reasons, one is 
hard-pressed to say they are wrong.196 
 
Frequently, integration is illusory; children are placed in specialized classes that share space with 
general education students, with only token interaction at a distance.197 
The public school placement offered in M.H. v. New York City Department of Education 
is a prime example of special education children being placed in specialized classes.198 The 
parents in that case sought tuition reimbursement for the Brooklyn Autism Center (“BAC”).199 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Clemton Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 n.18 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 
688, 695 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Weber, supra note 9, at 183 (noting that services and school settings must be adequate to support a 
child’s needs in order to accomplish inclusion).  
191 S. REP. NO. 105-17 (1997).  
192 20 U.S.C§1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (stating that the statute’s purpose was “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to 
them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs 
and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living”); see also Chopp, supra note 5, at 441.  
193 Goldman, supra note 35, at 244. 
194 See discussion infra Part III. 
195 See C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 837 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that parents who feel their children have 
been denied a FAPE “are often forced to turn to specialized private schools that educate only disabled children”).  
196 Weber, supra note 9, at 185. 
197 See, e.g., Colker, supra note 1, at 844 (mentioning Oakstone Academy in Ohio, which features small class sizes and enrollment of 
autistic and neurotypicals in the same classroom). 
198 M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 712 F. Supp. 2d 125, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 685 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2012). M.H.’s claims were 
heard in tandem with those of M.S., another autistic student enrolled in BAC. Id. at 223. Whereas it was found that M.H. had been 
denied a FAPE, the opposite result obtained with respect to the companion M.S. case. M.H., 685 F.3d at 258. 
199 M.H., 685 F.3d at 229.  
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The IEP, that was contested by the parents and found inappropriate by the court placed the child 
in a segregated, small special class in a special school with related services.200 BAC provided 
individualized education in a segregated classroom, but recess, hallways and two non-academic 
classes were shared with typically-developing students at the host school.201 The New York 
Department of Education (“N.Y. D.O.E.”) argued that the one-on-one setting was overly 
restrictive, but the court held that BAC was appropriate.202 The court noted that the public school 
placement offered by the N.Y. D.O.E. merely gave lip service to the LRE concept; testimony 
established that there was no real social interaction between mainstream and disabled students.203 
Though housed in a school with mainstream programs, children in the special education program 
offered to M.H. used a separate entrance, separate cafeteria and separate classes.204 By any 
measure, this is unjustified tokenism that fails to serve the IDEA’s purposes. 
The authors acknowledge that some parents still have to fight for integration. Those 
parents at least find protection in the strong body of law supportive of inclusion. Others, however, 
are presented with sub-standard public educational options and are forced to fight for specialized 
placements. An ill-kept secret is that punitive litigation is a tactic regularly used by school 
districts to threaten or wear down parents.205 School districts, defending against private placement 
claims on the grounds of restrictiveness are not really advancing lofty integrationist ideals; 
instead, cost considerations are the real impetus,206 or they simply cannot deliver.207  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 M.H., 712 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
201 Id. at 144. 
202 M.H., 685 F.3d at 252–54.  
203 Id. at 254.  
204 Id.  
205 S. Rep 108-185, S. Rep. No. 185, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 2003, 2003 WL 22536141, at *6 (Leg. Hist.). The 2004 amendments 
acknowledged this: “The committee is discouraged to hear that many parents, teachers, and school officials find that some current 
IDEA provisions encourage an adversarial, rather than a cooperative, atmosphere, in regards to special education.” Id. See also infra 
note 5 (noting that school districts are able to secure liability insurance coverage funding the defense of actions claiming IEP 
deficiencies and that attorneys’ fees may be recovered by parents who are the substantially prevailing party, but that expert witness 
fees are not recoverable).  
206 EDUC. LAW CTR., FUNDING, FORMULAS, AND FAIRNESS: WHAT PENNSYLVANIA CAN LEARN FROM OTHER STATES’ EDUCATION 
FUNDING FORMULAS 2 (2013), available at http://www.elc-pa.org/ELC_schoolfundingreport.2013.pdf (explaining how the IDEA 
provides nominal monetary support for special education and that local school districts primarily shoulder the load); see also Bd. of 
Educ. Minutes from the N. Shore Sch. Dist. (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.northshore.k12.ny.us/Board_of_Ed/Minutes/2012/2-16-12-Minutes.pdf (showing how the Superintendent responds to 
complaints about amounts budgeted to special education).  
207 Special education students comprised thirteen percent of the total population in 2011–2012, amounting to 6.4 million students out 
of a total elementary and secondary school population of fifty-five million. GRACE KENA ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2014 54–55 (Thomas Nachazel & Allison Dziuba eds., 2014), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014083.pdf. Of those 6.4 million students classified under the IDEA, ninety-five percent are enrolled in 
regular schools. Id. Outcomes for these students, however, are substandard. For instance, 74.9 percent of all high school students in 
New York graduated high school in four years in June 2013, whereas only 48.7 percent of students with disabilities graduated from 
high school in four years for the same period and 37.2 percent of the total graduating cohort were college and career ready, while only 
5.4 percent of the disabled students were college and career ready. SPECIAL EDUC. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE NETWORKS, NEW YORK’S 
STATE SYSTEMIC IMPROVEMENT PLAN (SSIP) FOR RESULTS DRIVEN ACCOUNTABILITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 18 (2014), available 
at http://media.wix.com/ugd/10c789_01ae2271dcd9460db847f1c96648d9d6.pdf; see also Graduation Rate Data, N.Y. STATE EDUC. 
DEP’T (June 23, 2014), http://www.p12.nysed.gov/irs/pressRelease/20140623/home.html (follow “Graduation Rate and Enrollment 
Outcomes by Student Subgroup” hyperlink) (showing also that the dropout rate of all students for the 2009 four-year cohort was 7.8 
percent among all students, with a 6.8 percent dropout rate among the general education population and a remarkable 13.9 percent 
dropout rate among students with disabilities). Cf. MARIE C. STETSER & ROBERT STILLWELL, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL FOUR-YEAR ON-TIME GRADUATION RATES AND EVENT DROPOUT RATES: SCHOOL YEARS 2010–11 AND 2011–
12 9 (2014), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014391.pdf (citing national figures showing an overall graduation rate of 
eighty percent graduation rate among all students and a sixty-one percent graduation rate for disabled students as of June 2012). The 
national dropout rate among all students in the United States in 2012 was seven percent. Fast Facts: Dropout Rates, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=16 (last visited May 12, 2015). The dropout rate for IDEA classified 
students ages fourteen to twenty-one in 2012 was 19.7 percent. Annual Disability Statistics Compendium: Table 11.7: Special 
Education—Dropout Rate[1] Among Students Ages 14 to 21 Served Under IDEA, Part B: 2011-2012, INST. ON DISABILITY, UNIV. OF 	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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Integration for integration’s sake may have been valid when the IDEA was initially 
passed, and though inclusion remains a policy concern, it is no longer a pressing one. The greater 
concern is qualitative. If the IDEA seeks to emphasize a qualitative agenda, then a blanket 
integration presumption does not serve this objective. However, sometimes it is legitimate to 
sacrifice educational benefit for the greater social benefit of being surrounded by mainstream 
peers. The analysis must be truly individualized—and the identity of party advancing an 
argument for inclusion is significant. However, if a parent is seeking inclusion, the LRE standard 
should be vigorously upheld; if a school district has failed to offer a FAPE and tuition 
reimbursement is sought, restrictiveness should not be a permissible defense or a consideration in 
assessing the appropriateness of the private school. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
N.H., http://disabilitycompendium.org/compendium-statistics/special-education/11-7-special-education-dropout-rate-among-students-
ages-14-21-served-under-idea-part-b (last visited May 12, 2015); see also CHRIS CHAPMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, TRENDS IN HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT AND COMPLETION RATES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1972–2009 9 (2011), available at 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012006.pdf (noting that dropout rates for students with disabilities was reported to be twice that of non-
disabled students nationally, 15.5 as compared to 7.8 percent). Ultimately, a lower educational level translates into a reduced earning 
capacity. See Digest of Education Statistics: Table 502.30: Median Annual Earnings of Full-time Year-round Workers 25 to 34 Years 
Old and Full-time Year-Round Workers as a Percentage of the Labor Force, by Sex, Race/Ethnicity, and Educational Attainment: 
Selected Years, 1995 Through 2012, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_502.30.asp. Specific Learning Disabilities (“SLD”) account for 40.7 percent of 
the IDEA classified student population and includes students with dyslexia, dysgraphia, auditory/visual processing disorders and 
nonverbal learning disabilities. CANDACE CORTIELLA, NAT’L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES, DIPLOMAS AT RISK, A CRITICAL 
LOOK AT THE GRADUATION RATE OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 6 (2013), available at http://www.ncld.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/DiplomasatRisk.pdf. This report states:  
In the 2010–2011 school year, 221,000 students with SLD left high school. Of these, just sixty-eight 
percent (151,000 students) left with a regular diploma while nineteen percent (43,000 students) dropped out. 
Twelve percent (26,000) of students with SLD left school with a certificate—a document recognizing the 
student’s completion of a school program but not recognized for postsecondary education or employment.  
This low rate of high school graduation with a regular diploma has a serious impact on the 
employment rate and earnings of students with SLD. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
unemployment rate for those with less than a high school diploma is over twelve percent—almost double that of 
all workers. The median weekly earnings is $471—a bit more than half that of all workers. 
Id. at 7 (citation omitted).  
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